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ABSTRACT
The decision of a venture capitalist to commit capital in a new risky business is a complex decision.
Investors need to consider a number of important criteria simultaneously. Based on the postulates of
signaling theory and the investment criteria outlined in the extant literature, we propose a theoretical
framework to describe the relationship between a new venture’s characteristics and the funding decision.
The proposed framework is tested using actual data of a unique sample of 200 new Egyptian technological
startups. The startups were tracked from establishment until applying to a venture capitalist and a decision
was made either to accept or to reject them. Logistic regression analysis reveals that venture capitalists
prefer to invest in startups with mature products and actual financial performance. The entrepreneurs’
industry experience and the size of their social networks are important factors that affect the startup’s access
to finance. Using decision tree analysis to map venture capitalists’ decisions, we show that the time of
applying for funds is critical and serves as a gateway for further evaluation. Startups are more likely rejected
for applying later into the venture capital fund than for lack of experience or unproved products. This
suggests that the development of the Egyptian tech ecosystem may be hugely constrained by the limited
availability of capital as well as the high aversion to risk on behalf of venture capitalists.
Keywords: venture capital, selection criteria, tech startups, entrepreneurial finance, Egypt

1. Introduction
Venture capital is an important source of entrepreneurial finance. In addition to obtaining
the needed funds to support their growth, startups also benefit from the venture capitalists’ business
acumen, networks and various other valuable resources. Over the past forty years, the VC industry
in the US has proved to be very efficient, creating a large number of very successful companies.
This has led other countries around the world to copy the US VC model, although the emergent
models are not without their own variations. Despite the widespread and growth of VC worldwide,
the majority of new companies are often unsuccessful in getting funded by venture capitalists (VCs
hereafter).
Copyright © 2019 Pepperdine Digital Commons and the Academy of Entrepreneurial Finance. All rights
reserved. ISSN: 2373-1761.
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This has directed much research effort to identify how VCs select their investments.
Empirical research revealed a number of important criteria that VCs use in the process of selecting
their investments. clude market attractiveness, product differentiation, managerial capabilities
(Chorev & Anderson, 2006; Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984), long-term growth and profitability of the
industry (Hall & Hofer, 1993), preferences of VCs to invest earlier or later
along a firm's life cycle (Gompers, 1997) as well as the probability of a successful exit (Tyebjee
& Bruno, 1984).
In Egypt, increased attention is being directed to promote innovation and entrepreneurial
firms to promote economic conditions. Several proactive policies and programs are now in place
to facilitate registering, establishing and development of new firms (Alsharif, 2015). Although the
size of venture capital investments in Egyptian startups is increasing, little is known about how
VCs make investment decisions and what characteristics do they look for in a new venture. By
proposing and testing a theoretical framework that links criteria identified in the literature to the
VC investment decision, the study contributes to the understanding and theorizing of venture
capital decision-making in general, while also evaluating how the Egyptian environment could
have shaped VC investment criteria.
Venture capital decision-making has been extensively described in the literature by many
researchers, nonetheless, it remains under-theorized (Alemany & Villanueva, 2015). Numerous
studies investigated the investment criteria that VC considered important in evaluating and
selecting startups. Studies by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), MacMillan et al. (1985, 1987), Silva
(2004), Zhang (2007) and Gompers et al. (2010) among others show that VCs investing in newlyformed startups prioritize factors related to the entrepreneur/management team, factors related to
the market potential followed by those related to the product/service offering. After this 'startup'
stage, the evaluation of ventures in the 'early-growth' stage is more focused on financial aspects
such as profit margins, costs of scalability of operations and exit possibilities.
Despite the extensive research on VC selection and evaluation criteria, there is inconclusive
evidence that these criteria will actually generate higher subsequent performance or superior
growth for the new venture (Alemany & Villanueva, 2015). Linking the criteria of VC funding
and subsequent performance, however, is necessary for the development of theory. Petty and
Gruber (2011) propose that this missing link is the result of the methodology used in prior research.
Researchers first conducted surveys and interviews where venture capitalists were asked to rank
different criteria according to their importance in shaping the investment decision (Sharma, 2015).
Results showed that the characteristics of the entrepreneurial team, the characteristics of the
product and the market opportunity were considered of top priority, followed by the financial
aspects of the deal. However, these studies often contradicted as to which category ranked before
the other. Results were also prone to self-reporting errors and post-hoc rationalization (Petty &
Gruber, 2011) as well as recollection mistakes (Alemany & Villanueva, 2015; Shepherd &
Zacharakis, 1999). In addition, VCs might have been more likely to report criteria that should be
used rather than criteria they actually used (Nunes et al., 2014; Sharma, 2015).
Other researchers used verbal protocols (Sandberg et al., 1988), where the real-time
capturing and analysis of venture capitalists' decision processes allowed researchers to unravel the
investment criteria that were actually 'in use'. Believed to be more accurate, these studies suggested
that venture capitalists may ‘lack insight’ into their own decision-making (Shepherd, 1999;
Zacharakis & Meyer, 1998). However, verbal controls were not without their own limitations.
ISMAIL AND MEDHAT * VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS *
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They were often limited to a smaller number of cases and were prone to the subjective
interpretation of the researcher (Alemany & Villanueva, 2015). The next wave of studies, which
were experiment-like and used conjoint analysis, were criticized for having low validity,
impracticality and oversimplification. The experiments focused on one stage of the decisionmaking process as opposed to the dynamic settings in which VCs make investment decisions,
therefore they provided an incomplete understanding of the investment criteria that were critical
for venture capitalists (Petty & Gruber, 2011).
2. Theoretical foundation and hypotheses development
The role of signaling is established in the study of entrepreneurship. Evidence shows that
the intensity and importance of a signal are positively related to the size of informational gaps that
exist in the market. Entrepreneurial companies are characterized by huge uncertainty and high
failure rates (Gompers et al., 2016). At the earlier stages, the company's assets are intangible and
centered on the innovative ideas and skills of the entrepreneur. Before selecting their investments,
venture capitalists typically expend great effort and time in gathering information to overcome
informational gaps and to reduce opportunistic behavior as much as possible (Zacharakis & Meyer,
1998).
Signaling theory may explain why venture capitalists rely on the information they gather
about entrepreneurs to predict whether a venture will be successful. It is a real challenge to identify
competent management that would be able to generate high performance. Because of the
uncertainty surrounding a new startup, at the time of assessment, venture capitalists rely on the
observable attributes that are ‘presumably correlated to unobservable determinants of quality’
(Hoenig & Henkel, 2015).
2.1 Criteria related to the quality of the entrepreneurial team
MacMillan et al. (1985) show that the most important criteria to the venture capitalist are
the entrepreneur's personality and experience. The study by Bhide (2000) showed that most
successful entrepreneurial ideas came to founders while working with prominent past employers.
According to Hsu (2007) and Zhang (2007), serial entrepreneurs not only have higher chances of
being selected by venture capitalists but they also raise higher amounts of funding in their earlier
rounds. Zhang (2007) explains that the superior performance of serial entrepreneurs may result
from their ability to 'learn by doing' which enhances their entrepreneurial skills as well as the
important connections that they have established in previous founding experiences particularly
with VCs, and which may become beneficial in the future.
Similarly, Gompers et al. (2016) show that the quality of management and management
commitment are the criteria receiving the highest weight in the assessment of proposals and
attribute the likelihood of investment success or failure to the entrepreneur rather than to the market
or the business itself. Entrepreneurs' characteristics included among the highest valued criteria
alternate between experience, skills, personality, enthusiasm and past entrepreneurial success
(Gompers et al., 2010; Zhang, 2007; Silva, 2004). In the study by Bernstein et al. (2017) show that
investors react most strongly to the information about a startup's founding team then to traction
and prior investors.
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Social capital and network relationships are important for entrepreneurs and may improve
their chances of securing funding to their ventures. In uncertain environments, investors are more
likely to place greater weight on the attributes of founders relative to other aspects of the business.
When deciding to fund a startup or an early-stage venture, the quality of the entrepreneurial team
is expected to be of critical importance for venture capitalists. However, venture capitalists cannot
possibly judge new entrepreneurs using characteristics such as ‘integrity’, ‘passion’, ‘work ethics’
and ‘leadership' without actually entering into a working relationship with them. These criteria
cannot be observed during decision-making. On the other hand, entrepreneur’s industry experience
and education are objective measures. Likewise, the completeness of the team where important
positions are filled is also objective. Therefore we formulate the following hypotheses about
entrepreneurs using objective characteristics
H 1: Entrepreneurs' characteristics are important criteria that affect venture capitalists'
investment decision making.
H 1.1: The quality of entrepreneur’s education has a positive effect on the funding decision
H 1.2: Prior industry experience has a positive effect on the funding decision
H 1.3: Diversity in the entrepreneurial teams' education/background have a positive effect on
the funding decision
H 1.4: The size of the entrepreneur's social network has a positive effect on the funding
decision
H 1.5: Entrepreneurs' commitment has a positive effect on the funding decision
2.2 Criteria related to the product
Despite the predominance of the criteria related to the entrepreneur in VC investment
decision making (Gompers et al., 2016), those related to the product and to the market are found
to be equally important, as witnessed by previous studies (Hall & Hofer, 1993; Rah et al., 1994).
Other important criteria were related to the business proposition; whether the business is scalable
and has high sustainable growth potential (Hellmann & Puri, 2000; Kaplan et al., 2009), also those
related to the product/service offering and the technology supporting the product; criteria related
to the market potential and level of competition (Gompers et al., 2016), and criteria related to the
developmental stage of the venture (Pries, 2001). Although part of the fame earned by US VC was
because of their endorsement to some of the most innovative ideas and revolutionary technologies,
in less developed, less stable economies VC may shy away from ventures with novel, untested
products or innovative value propositions where the underlying technology is yet to be proved.
Venture capitalists may prefer investing in ventures that already have had some success in the
market or resemble others that proved to be successful, in other words, ventures that are
commercially viable. Accordingly, the following hypotheses are tested:
H 2: Product/service characteristics affect venture capitalists' investment decision making.
H 2.1: Commercialized products (early validation) have a positive effect on the funding
decision
H 2.2: Products/services that resemble past successes have a positive effect on the funding
decision
ISMAIL AND MEDHAT * VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS *
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2.3 Criteria related to the market opportunity
Studies also show that venture capitalists prefer to invest in tested products given there is
still room for new market players. Several researchers provide evidence that market characteristics,
such as the degree of competition and ease of entry are important investment criteria for venture
capitalists (Gompers et al., 2016; Nunes et al., 2014; Simic, 2015). Their logic is obvious; for VCs
to ascertain handsome returns on their investment, a venture needs to compete in a large and a
growing market (Fried & Hisrich, 1994; Nunes et al., 2014; Petty & Gruber, 2011; Simic, 2015).
In addition, the presence of a developed customer base proves that the startup is accepted in the
market. We test whether the growth rate of the target market and an existing proof of market
acceptance are important criteria for VC.
H 3: Market characteristics are important criteria that affect venture capitalists' investment
decision making.
H 3.1: Higher growth in the startup target market has a positive effect on the funding decision
H 3.2: Proof of market acceptance has a positive effect on the funding decision
2.4 Availability of financial information
Venture capitalists take into consideration a large amount of intangible and subjective
information about early stage startups (Armandi, 2015; Gompers et al., 2016; Sharma, 2015;
Wright & Robbie, 1998). For obvious reasons, financial information about the new venture is
greatly lacking. The high degree of uncertainty often leads to a wide discrepancy between
entrepreneurs' own financial projections, VC projections and subsequent actual performance.
Forecasting then discounting cash flows is extremely difficult when a venture has not yet generated
profits or revenues, and would lead to inaccurate estimates of a startup true value (Gompers et al.,
2016). Nonetheless, if available, financial information help VCs greatly when making evaluations
of a potential investment (kohn, 2018). Venture capitalists prefer to base their projections on actual
revenues and cash flows rather than depend on the projections supplied by entrepreneurs that are
not based on actual data.
H 4: Disclosure of positive revenues has a positive effect on the funding decision.

2.5 The Relationship between VC and Prior Investors
Angel investors fund startups at the very early stages of development. Angels are typically
former entrepreneurs who provide much needed expertise and post-investment mentoring to
nascent companies, although the size of their investment is relatively smaller than that of VC
(Mason & Harrison, 1996; Wiltbank et al., 2009). Researchers suggest that investment decisionmaking of angel investors and venture capitalists might be similar, however, the relationship
between them with regard to a single investment remains under-researched. Mason and Stark
(2004) suggest that angel investors' experience, hands-on management, active coaching and other
value-adding activities can reduce moral hazard and elicit a relationship of trust. The study by
Wong et al. (2009) reveals that the roles of angel investors and venture capitalists complement
ISMAIL AND MEDHAT * VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS *
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each other. The study also shows that professional networks of angel investors can help
entrepreneurs access VC funds faster.
In emerging markets, the relationship between angel investors and venture capitalists is
less clear. Little is known on whether prior funding by angel investors is regarded positively by
the venture capitalist. A co-investment strategy between angels and venture capitalists may, in
theory, help reduce the severity of economic and market conditions through spreading the risks
(Scheela et al., 2015). While the involvement of one angel investor may be observed as a good
signal, receiving many rounds of seed funding may not. The presence of more investors means
that the new startup has relinquished a larger portion of its equity (Ibrahim, 2013). This can deter
venture capitalists from investing because returns of all investors will be reduced. Based on the
previous argument, to test whether prior investments affect the VC's decision to fund a new startup,
the following are hypothesized:
H 5: Involvement of prior investors has a positive effect on the funding decision
2.6 The Role of VC Experience and Stage of the VC Fund in Startup Selection
A number of studies have examined the effect of VC-specific factors on the VC decisionmaking process (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2000; Mishra et al., 2017; Rakhman & Evans, 2005).
However, there are inconclusive evidence on how VC-specific factors impact venture selection.
The venture capitalist industry experience and educational background are among the most
researched factors. Gompers et al. (2008) study VC cycles and show that experienced venture
capitalists are more sensitive to favorable public market signals and respond by increasing their
investments more readily than venture capitalists with less experience and those experienced in
different industries. Franke et al. (2008) find differences in the ranking of investment criteria
between more and less experienced venture capitalists. Whether a match between the industry
expertise of the VC and the industry of the new startup actually affected the final funding decision
was not examined.
More recently, Cox et al. (2017) suggest that an 'investment paradox' exists when
fundamental criteria about the team, the product and the market are met but investors are still
unwilling to invest in a new venture. They show that the relationship between the business angels'
criteria and the overall investment potential of a new venture is moderated by the business angels'
industry experience. The present study tests the hypotheses that a fit between VC-related factors
and a new investment actually moderates the relationship between the fundamental criteria and the
decision to invest. Possessing the relevant industry experience can help investors evaluate the
entrepreneur's capabilities more accurately, communicate better with the venture's management
team and eventually add more value to the new venture. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is
formulated:
H 6: VC industry experience positively moderates the relationship between the startup
characteristics and the funding decision
In addition to VC industry experience, characteristics of the VC fund can determine
whether a specific investment will be accepted or rejected by the venture capitalist. A good
ISMAIL AND MEDHAT * VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS *
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investment opportunity may still be rejected for a number of reasons including a misalignment
with the VC fund strategy or with the fund remaining life. A venture capitalist with a strategy to
diversify across industries may select different investments to a venture capitalist that wants to
create synergistic value between portfolio companies. In addition, VC investments are eventually
cashed out/liquidated to provide returns to LPs. Therefore upon approaching the end life of the
fund, VC may seek quicker profits and are more likely to invest in the fewer ventures that can be
exited from quickly. Startups requiring a longer time frame to achieve a successful exit will be
rejected regardless of management quality and the attractiveness of products and/or markets. This
means that startups have higher chances of getting funded around the beginning of a new VC fund.
H 7: The VC fund maturity negatively moderates the relationship between the startup
characteristics and the funding decision
The hypotheses stated above test some of the already examined relationships in previous
studies. However, instead of relying on the ratings of the venture capitalists themselves that were
provided in surveys and interviews or extracted from venture capitalists’ executive summaries, the
present study reformulated these relationships as hypotheses to be tested using actual data about
startups’ entrepreneurs, products/services and markets. Similar hypotheses were tested to predict
subsequent venture (financial) performance (Alemany & Villanueva, 2015), to distinguish highflyer exits from non-high-flyer exits (Streletzki & Schulte, 2013) but not to predict the funding
decision which is examined here.
In previous studies, researchers used criteria such as the expected rate of return, size of the
investment, exit opportunities, among others to investigate the importance of the financial aspects
of the deal. We test the relationship between the disclosure of positive revenues and the funding
decision (H4) to reflect a number of attributes about the startup. First, the degree of uncertainty
about the startup is reduced and venture capitalists could base their evaluations on more reliable
information. Second, the stage of the startup is accounted for to show whether the venture capitalist
supplying the first round is more inclined to select post-revenue startups. This may reflect a higher
degree of risk aversion for venture capitalists investing in Egypt. By proposing that characteristics
of the venture capital fund moderate the relationship between the characteristics of a startup and
the final funding decision (H6 and H7), we build on the findings of Petty and Gruber (2011) who
reported that fund-related characteristics, such as ‘inappropriate timing’, ‘no remaining fund for
region’, and ‘competition with existing portfolio’ were basis for deal rejection.
Drawing on multiple theoretical relationships, the proposed framework (Figure 1)
combines the important criteria outlined in the literature to represent a unique view to venture
capital decision making as a complex process. Further research could test the relevance of different
sub-criteria according to the context.
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Figure 1 A framework to explain the relationship between VC Investment Criteria, VC
Characteristics and the Funding Decision

3. Method and data collection
One of the main contributions of the present study is that it overcomes the limitations of
prior works by employing a different approach to study venture capitalists’ investment decisions.
Instead of interviewing venture capitalists, the actual data about 200 Egyptian startup ventures,
their entrepreneurial teams, products and markets were collected and analyzed. The convenience
sampling approach was used1 and the information about the startups were hand-collected from a
variety of sources. Information about new startup founding and VC and angel funding were
obtained from the websites of CrunchBase, AngelList, and Startup Ranking as well as from news
clips, business articles, and the websites of venture capial firms.
Information about entrepreneurs' education and experience were obtained from LinkedIn.
Reports published by MENA Private Equity and Venture Capital Association and the electronic
1

Although randomness would have been preferable in order to render conclusions more generalizable, the sample constituted one
third of the startups listed on AngelList (around 620 startups) by end of 2018.
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portals of Magnitt and VCAfrica were used to gather information about the availability of VC
funds and the investments that took place each year. Special attention was given to include only
startups for which all the needed information is available and verifiable. Startups with missing
information were replaced. Each company was tracked from the year it was established, through
important events and activities until the end of 2018. The startups were established between 2004
and 2017. Table 1 shows the industry and age of startups in the sample.
Table 1 Number and age of startups by industry
Industry Classification
Advertising & Marketing
Agribusiness
Business Services & Enterprise Software
Consumer Services
Delivery & Logistics
E-commerce
Education
Energy & Clean tech
Financial services
Healthcare
HR & Recruitment
Manufacturing (B2B)
Media & Entertainment
Network & Community
Real Estate
Transportation
Technology & IT solutions
Travel & Tourism
Total

Total

VC- Funded

Av. Age (yrs)

8
4
10
8
3
34
12
5
15
14
5
1
12
16
2
10
37
4
200

0
1
2
2
1
16
3
2
7
5
2
1
4
2
2
4
10
0
64

7.71
5.68
6.16
4.12
3.70
5.59
3.94
6.25
4.47
4.77
6.52
6.28
5.89
5.96
5.74
4.95
5.05
5.41
5.20

Startups classified by type of seed funding received prior to applying to obtain VC funds
are shown in Table 2. All percentages are calculated for the total sample (N=200). A relatively
higher percentage of VC-funded startups had no prior investors followed by those which attended
acceleration/incubation programs. Out of the sampled 200 startups, 64 startups (32.5%) received
VC-backing, 19 startups (9.5%) received angel investments whether solely or in addition to being
accelerator-backed. Similarly a total of 105 startups (52.5%) received investments from
accelerators/incubators, 10 of which (5%) have also received angel investments. A very small
number of startups received grants or financial prizes through the participation in startup events.
The awarded sums of money in such events are often miniscule compared to what is needed to
start a business. In addition, founders would need to invest their own funds initially to build a
working prototype in order to compete in such events.
The frequencies and percentages of important characteristics observed in the sample are
shown in Table 3. Each of these characteristics is represented by a binary variable that takes the
value of 1 if the characteristic is observed in the startup, and zero if it is not observed. Percentages
are calculated based on the column total. A larger difference between the two groups exists for
industry experience, and possessing a ready product, as well as generating revenues. Endorsement
is the only variable that was observed more in the non VC-funded group. The majority of startups
in the sample had committed teams (71%) and products which had some initial level of market
ISMAIL AND MEDHAT * VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS *
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acceptance (73%). The average number of engagements is higher in the funded group (bottom
line).

Table 2 Type of Seed Funding Received Prior VC
Type of Seed Funding
VC-funded
Accelerator/Incubator-backed
21 (10.5%)
Angel investors only
3 (1.5%)
Accelerator & Angel investors
5 (2.5%)
Grants/prize Only
3 (1.5%)
None
32 (16%)

Non VC- funded
74 (37%)
6 (3%)
5 (2.5%)
12 (6%)
39 (19.5%)

Total
95 (47.5%)
9 (4.5%)
10 (5%)
15 (7.5%)
71 (35.5%)

Table 3 Frequency of Observing Important Characteristics in the Sample

Education (Foreign)
Industry Experience
Team (Diversity)
Commitment
Past Success
Product Stage
Market Growth (High)
Market Acceptance
Revenue
Endorsement

VC-funded
N=64
37 (58%)
46 (72%)
33 (52%)
57 (89%)
39 (61%)
47 (73%)
33 (52%)
59 (92%)
52 (81%)
29 (45%)

Non VC- funded
N=136
67 (49%)
31 (23%)
55 (40%)
85 (63%)
62 (46%)
28 (21%)
53 (39%)
86 (63%)
43 (32%)
85 (63%)

Total
N=200
104 (52%)
77 (39%)
88 (44%)
142 (71%)
101 (51%)
75 (38%)
86 (43%)
145 (73%)
95 (48%)
114 (57%)

Engagement (average)

3.28

2.49

2.74

4. Variables and measurement
The following section describes the variables of the study and explains how they are
measured.
Variables

Description

Measurement

Independent Variables
1- Characteristics of the Entrepreneurial Team
1.1 Education

Type of education received by the lead Dichotomous Variable
entrepreneur(s).
1= foreign /
international education2
0 = otherwise

2

Foreign education received in Egypt or abroad is regarded as superior to the national education. According to the Global
Entrepreneurship Monitor ‘GEM Egypt report 2012, the national education system is one of the major constraining factors to the
development of entrepreneurial ecosystem in Egypt.
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1.2 Experience

Entrepreneurs possess
Dichotomous Variable
- Industry experience if they have worked for a 1= previous experience
company in the same industry for at least 5 years 0= no experience

1.3 Background Whether members of the entrepreneurial team Dichotomous Variable
Diversity (team) have different backgrounds representing 1 = diverse background
important functional areas e.g. production,
0= similar background
marketing/sales, etc.
1.4
Commitment

Entrepreneur devotes entire time to the startup Dichotomous Variable
(e.g. does not hold other jobs at overlapping dates 1 = committed
with the startup establishment or quit original job
0 = not committed
to establish startup).3

1.5
Size of The number of startup events and engagements in Continuous (Number)
Social Network which the startup has participated prior to the
(Engagement)
application for funds
2- Product/Service Characteristics
2.1 Product
Stage

Marking the developmental stage of the startup's Dichotomous Variable
product at the time of application for funds.4 1 = fully developed
Products are divided into fully developed products
0 = not fully developed
that are ready to be commercialized and products
that still need further development

2.2 Product
Novelty

Whether the product resembles another that is a Dichotomous Variable
proven past success or is completely new
1 = past success
0 = new

3- Market Characteristics
3.1 Market
Growth

The growth in the startup primary market Dichotomous Variable
indicates how promising the business opportunity 1 = high growth
will be. Markets are divided to high-growth and
0 = low growth
low-growth.5

3

Only time commitment was included in the analysis. Almost all founders in the sample used their own funds (or funds of family
and friends) at some time during startup establishment, therefore financial commitment was not considered.
4 A startup is often in continuous need of funding along a series of processes where it first develops a prototype, then tests a product,
then enters a pre-production stage to test the market, eventually producing and selling a successful product. The venture capitalist
may choose to wait until a product reaches a certain stage before investing.
5 First the actual market growth rates were obtained from official industry reports produced by Ministry of Communication and
Information Technology (MCIT) or (General Authority for Investment & Free Zones) GAFI. However, these growth rates
apparently lacked consistency. Therefore another measurement for market growth is used; the ranking of markets based on the
growth in the yearly number of VC deals made by MENA investors. These rankings were obtained from reports issued by the
MENA Private Equity and Venture Capital Association and had the same way of calculation each year. Higher-growth markets
included Fintech, E-commerce, Delivery & logistics, Transportation, Technology & IT solutions, Education, Health care and
Consumer services. Lower-growth markets included Advertising & marketing, Agribusiness, Business services, Energy & clean
tech, Recruitment, Manufacturing, Real Estate, Network & community, Travel & tourism and Manufacturing.
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3.2 Market
Acceptance

An existing customer base indicates a startup is Dichotomous Variable
already accepted in the market (market validation) 1= customer base
developed
0 = no Customer base

4- Financial Information Availability
4.1 Revenues

Dividing startups according to whether they Dichotomous Variable
generated positive or negative revenues at the time 1= generating positive
of applying for VC funding
revenues
0= zero or negative
revenues

5- Prior Investors
5.1
Endorsement

- Whether a startup has received a prior round of Dichotomous Variable
seed investment (measured as a binary variable in 1 = received funding
the logistic regression).
from a prior investor
0= didn't receive

Moderators
6- VC Industry Whether the venture capitalist has
Experience
experience in the industry of the startup6

7- Time into
Fund

prior Dichotomous Variable
1= VC experienced in
the startup industry
0 = VC not experienced
in the startup industry

The stage of the VC fund at the time of the startup Number of years that
passed from the start of
evaluation
fund prior to the startup
application

Dependent Variables
Funding
Decision

Whether the venture capitalist decides to invest in Dichotomous Variable
the startup
1=
startup
funded
(selection)
0= startup not funded
(rejection)

6

Experience of the venture capitalist came from prior investments made in the same industry as that of the startup being evaluated.
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5. Analysis and Results
Logistic regression was used to test the effect of the investment criteria on the funding
decision. Three models are tested and the results are shown in Table 4. Model 1 included eleven
independent variables with no interaction effects: education, industry experience, team,
commitment, engagement, ready product, past success, market acceptance, market growth,
revenues, and endorsement. The estimated coefficients of the variables, standard errors and odds
ratio are presented. The likelihood ratio for the joint significance of the explanatory variables is
estimated using the chi-square test, where x2 is 114.055, p-value ≤ 0.01. The variables: industry
experience, engagement, ready product, market growth, and revenue have significant coefficients
(p-value ≤ 0.05).
In the second and third runs of the LR (model 2 and model 3), in addition to main effects,
the moderation effects of ‘VC experience’ and ‘time into VC fund’ are tested by adding interaction
terms which combine these moderating factors with the independent variables. The two models
are statistically significant, but none of the coefficients of the interaction terms are of statistical
significance. This indicates that there are no combined effects for the variables included in the
interaction terms, however, VC experience and time into fund are significant independently and
are thus important on their own, not through their interaction components. Thus we reject
hypothesis 6 which states that VC industry experience positively moderates the relationship
between the startup characteristics and the investment decision and also reject hypothesis 7 which
states that the VC fund maturity negatively moderates the relationship between the startup
characteristics and the investment decision.
When testing the moderation of VC experience (model 2) and time into fund (model 3),
the models were liable to over-fitting, as the variables were augmented with the interaction terms
and might have caused the interaction terms to have insignificant coefficients. After eliminating
interaction terms, another LR is run (model 4) using ‘VC experience’ and ‘time into fund’ as
independent variables, in addition to the independent variables from model 1. Results are shown
in Table 5. The Nagelkerke R-square ranges from 0 to 1 and approximates how much variation in
the outcome is explained by the variables in the model (Field, 2008). It also gives an indication on
the predictive power of the LR. Model 4 explains approximately 76% of the funding decision and
therefore it does relatively well in explaining which startups receive funding. There are five
variables in the model that significantly influence whether a startup gets VC funding or not. The
variables with the statistically significant effect are industry experience, ready product, revenue,
engagement and time into fund.
For the categorical variables, the table shows the β coefficient of industry experience is
positive (2.267) and significant at the 1% level, indicating that possessing industry experience is
associated with increased odds of achieving funding. The odds ratio (OR) show that entrepreneurs
with industry experience are almost 10 times more likely (9.651 times) to get funded than their
unexperienced counterparts. Therefore hypothesis 1.2 that states prior industry experience has a
positive effect on the funding decision is accepted. Ready product is another important factor. Its
coefficient is positive (1.615) and significant at the 5% level. Its OR indicates that startups with
ready products are 5 times more likely to get funded than startups whose products are still
undeveloped. Therefore hypothesis 2.1 which states that commercially viable products/services
have a positive effect on the funding decision is accepted.
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Table 4 Logistic regression results before and after introducing moderator variables
Model 1
Variable/ Main effects

β

Model 2

S.E

OR

-7.22***

1.336

.001

-.031

.461

2.223***
-1.61

β

Model 3

S.E

OR

-2.635***

1.1859

.072

.969

.238

.6846

.450

9.232

2.754***

.448

.852

.278

.275

.622

1.317

.154**

.072

1.167

2.038***

.4789

.741*
.659**

β

S.E

OR

-13.344*

5.1914

1.602E-6

1.268

1.665

3.1518

5.287

.7969

15.700

6.651**

2.8458

773.187

.6936

1.320

4.931*

2.8118

138.503

-.307

1.0653

.736

-3.182

4.3927

.041

-.177**

.0947

.838

-.644

.6643

.525

7.677

1.867***

.8278

6.469

3.118

3.6110

22.601

.455

2.099

1.074**

.7322

2.928

-.050

3.2416

.951

.330

1.933

-.647***

.6584

.524

-.892

3.0053

.410

.066

.710

1.068

.225

.8958

1.253

-1.329

3.4808

.265

.1.182**

.538

3.261

2.031**

.7765

7.620

3.366

3.1238

28.971

-.681

.476

.506

-.276

.7947

.759

-1.772

2.7327

.170

.066***

1.8475

1.068

-.802

1.0934

.448

.255

1.1816

1.290

-.140

1.0653

.870

1.843

1.6608

6.319

.001

.1363

1.001

.591

1.0877

1.805

.090

1.0462

1.095

1.700*

1.1000

5.477

1.108

1.7434

3.030

-1.889*

1.0840

.151

-.660

1.1090

.517
4.717**

1.9048

111.824

-.563

1.2078

.053

-1.373

.9882

.253

-2.567*

1.1830

.077

1.161

1.8018

3.192

.130

.2368

1.139

.010

1.3943

1.010

.267

1.3226

.098

-1.069

1.2468

.343

Time into Fund * Market Acceptance

.320

1.3005

.108

Time into Fund * Revenue

-.637

1.1531

.529

Time into Fund * Endorsement

.192

.9954

1.212

Intercept
Education
Industry Experience
Team
Commitment
Engagement
Ready Product
Past Success
Market Growth
Market Acceptance
Revenue
Endorsement
Interaction Effects
VC Exp
VC Exp * Education
VC Exp * Industry Experience
VC Exp * Team
VC Exp * Commitment
VC Exp * Engagement
VC Exp * Ready Product
VC Exp * Past Success
VC Exp * Market Growth
VC Exp * Market Acceptance
VC Exp * Revenue
VC Exp * Endorsement
Time into Fund
Time into Fund * Education
Time into Fund * Industry Experience
Time into Fund * Team
Time into Fund * Commitment
Time into Fund * Engagement
Time into Fund * Ready Product
Time into Fund * Past Success
Time into Fund * Market Growth

Omnibus test
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square

114.055***

135.438***

174.700***

Log Likelihood

-68.346

-57.655

-38.024

Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC)

162.693

167.310

128.047

Goodness of Fit
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Level of significance: *: p ≤ 0.1;

**: p ≤ 0.05; ***: p ≤ 0.01

Revenues is also positive (1.323) and significant at the 5% level and OR indicates that
revenue generation increases the likelihood of getting funded by 3.755 times. Hence we accept
hypothesis 4 which states that the availability of financial information has a positive effect on the
funding decision.
In Model 4, two continuous variables are significant; engagement and time into fund. The
coefficient of engagement is positive and significant, although very small (0.189). The OR
indicates that for every one-unit increase in engagement, we expect a 1.2 increase in the log-odds
of getting funded, holding all other independent variables constant. Accordingly, we accept
hypothesis 1.5 that states that the size of the entrepreneur's social network has a positive effect on
the funding decision. In contrast, time into fund has a negative β coefficient (-2.144) and
significant at the 1% level. The OR indicates that for every one-unit increase in VC fund maturity,
the log-odds of a startup getting selected by VC drops by 0.117.
Table 5 Logistic regression results with main effects only
Model 4
β
-2.085
.058
2.267***
-.940
.056
.189**
1.615**
.616
.727
-.0236
1.323**
-.880
.455
-2.144***

Variable/ Main effects
Intercept
Education
Industry Experience
Team
Commitment
Engagement
Ready Product
Past Success
Market Growth
Market Acceptance
Revenue
Endorsement
VC Experience
Time into Fund
Omnibus test
Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square
Goodness of Fit
Log Likelihood
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC)
Cox & Snell R Square
Nagelkerke R Square
Level of significance: *: p ≤ 0.1;

**: p ≤ 0.05;

S.E
1.787
.603
.606
.605
.747
.092
.633
.594
.474
.825
.743
.605
.588
.423

OR
.124
1.060
9.651
.390
1.058
1.209
5.030
1.851
2.069
.790
3.755
.415
1.576
.117

157.790***
-46.479
120.957
.546
.764
***: p ≤ 0.01
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The following table summarizes the results of the hypothesis testing
H 1.1 The quality of entrepreneur’s education has a positive effect on the funding
decision

Rejected

H 1.2 Prior industry experience has a positive effect on the funding decision

Accepted

H 1.3 Diversity in the entrepreneurial teams' background has a positive effect on the
funding decision

Rejected

H 1.4 Entrepreneurs' commitment has a positive effect on the funding decision

Rejected

H 1.5 The size of the entrepreneur's social network has a positive effect on the funding
decision

Accepted

H 2.1 A commercialized product (early validation) has a positive effect on the funding
decision

Accepted

H 2.2 A product that resembles past successes have a positive effect on the funding
decision
H 3.1 Higher growth in the startup target market has a positive effect on the funding
decision

Rejected
Rejected

H 3.2 Proof of market acceptance has a positive effect on the funding decision

Rejected

H 4 Disclosure of positive revenues has a positive effect on the funding decision.

Accepted

H 5 Involvement of prior investors has a positive effect on the funding decision

Rejected

H 6 VC industry experience positively moderates the relationship between the startup
characteristics and the funding decision

Rejected

H 7 The VC fund maturity negatively moderates the relationship between the startup
characteristics and the funding decision7

Rejected

6. Discussion
The quality of the entrepreneur was found to be more important than all other factors to the
VC decision. Such finding is in line with the majority of the previous studies. The first of these
studies and perhaps the most cited is the one by MacMillian et al. (1985), who stated that ‘above
all other criteria, it is the entrepreneur’s quality that ultimately determines the investment
decision’. However, not all aspects of quality are of the same importance to the venture capitalist
investing in Egyptian tech startups. Venture capitalists invested in startups whose entrepreneurs
were experienced and had a track record in the industry. This finding was also documented by
Shepherd (1999), Franke et al. (2008) and Flynn (1991). The present study showed that neither
commitment nor diversity of the entrepreneurial team were found to be statistically significant in
shaping the funding decision. In addition, investors seemed to take less into their account the type
of education of the entrepreneurial team.
The diversity in the entrepreneurial teams’ background/education was not found to be of
sizeable significance. In fact, a large number of the startups that got funded had teams with the
The VC fund maturity acted as an independent variable rather than a moderating variable. All interaction effects with the model’s
main independent variables (criteria) have insignificant coefficients. The absence of moderation was the basis for rejecting the
hypothesis.
7
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same background and some had only one entrepreneur. In previous studies, production/process,
marketing/sales and financial/accounting capabilities of the team did not rank as high as other
aspects of the entrepreneurial team (Tyebjee & Bruno, 1984; MacMillan et al., 1985; Mishra et al.,
2017). A plausible explanation is that various business functions could now be outsourced to
professionals who work independently from the startup. With of growth of networks connecting
entrepreneurs and the spread of freelancing, functions such as advertising and marketing
campaigns could be easily commissioned at a relatively low cost. Alternatively, as the startup
grows, entrepreneurial teams could hire employees to carry out marketing, product design and
finance but without making them partners.
In line with findings of Zhang (2007), the size of the social network of the startup was
found to be important in shaping VC decisions. Entrepreneurs of funded startups had a higher level
of engagement in local and international startup events and competitions. Such events give a
positive signal on the quality of startup and bring entrepreneurs in contact with a wide network of
potential investors, business partners and support entities including accelerators and incubators.
These events also get considerable media coverage which can greatly help entrepreneurs in
accessing funds.
The study also revealed that startups whose products were fully developed and then tested
in the market had higher chances of getting funded than startups with prototypes or partially
developed products. With a ready or commercialized product, uncertainty is decreased and the
informational gaps are reduced and venture capitalists have a preliminary idea on what the business
is worth. This finding is in line with Amit et al. (1998) and Gupta and Sapienza (1992). In more
developed VC markets, however, the abundance of capital might be used more readily to back
promising business ideas. The scarcity of funds in the Egyptian VC market may cause investors to
be more careful with their money that they choose startups already showing some level of success
with their products. While this does not spur innovations by allowing ambitious entrepreneurs to
experiment and err with their ideas, it helps to weed out unsuccessful endeavors quickly. VCs were
not particularly keen to invest in startups that are similar to others that had succeeded in other parts
of the region. Investors fund startups with unique products/services as well as those resembling
past successes. While a previously proven business model may reduce the failure risks to investors,
a working product may mitigate such risks.
In contrast to previous research, market-related characteristics were not as important as the
other factors. This finding could be caused by a mismatch between a startup’s identified market
and the actual market it serves or the inaccuracy of the reported growth rates. To assume that
market growth is unimportant will be highly illogical, therefore alternative market characteristics
should be tested. The literature presents other reasons that could explain this finding. The flow of
VC funds is sometimes slow to react to changes in the market (Gompers et al., 2008). Alternatively,
VC activity may increase in slow growing markets that are on the verge of change. Competent
investors identify opportunities in untapped markets (low growth) that no one expects to be
profitable or can see that an industry is transforming and invest their money and time in it.
The study also shows that startups that have endured the earlier stages of development and
are generating positive cash flows have higher chances of getting funded by venture capitalists.
This finding is similar to that of Gompers (1997) and Dimov et al. (2007) who concluded that VC
prefer investment in companies at the revenue generation stage as investment risk is greatly
reduced. Although entrepreneurs communicate financial projections to investors through business
plans to show the potential of their startups, it helps a great deal when the financial projections are
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based on real financial performance. While early projections cannot be very accurate, they serve
as a quality signal that the startup’s product is successful and is a proof that a customer base is
already forming. Hence knowing the financial aspects can positively affect the VC evaluation of a
startup potential investment. Unfortunately, technology-based startups normally incur huge
upfront running and developmental costs, which means that early financial strains may decrease
the chances of getting funded by VC, ultimately jeopardizing the startups’ survival.
The presence of a prior investor did not affect the funding decision of the venture capitalist.
A number of reasons may account for this finding. The early investors operating in Egypt may still
lack the level of experience and accomplishment that would send a quality signal about the startups
they are backing. Alternatively venture capitalists may not be willing to share their returns with
others or fear getting tangled in contracts involving prior investors.
The study also reveals that the fund maturity is very important in determining whether a
startup will be selected. VCs closed the majority of their deals during the first two years after
capital had been pooled into the VC fund. After that, startups’ chances drop dramatically. The
effect of fund maturity is pronounced because of the limited number of funds raised. Upon
approaching the maturity of a fund, venture capitalists are more likely to make follow-on
investments in their portfolio rather than enter into new investments. On the other hand, the
industry experience of a venture capitalist did not affect the funding decision in a significant
manner. While seemingly odd, the VC market is still underdeveloped and most investors in our
sample did not have experience in the industry of the startups they invested in. The irrelevance of
industry experience was probably mitigated by the formation of syndicates and investing in mature
products as well as revenue-generating companies.
7. Capturing the interactions between Criteria
To capture the interactions between criteria, we model VC decisions using decision trees.
Decision trees are very interpretable and create very good explanations of the data in the form of
if-then-else decisions as well as allow visualization of the data (Hastie et al., 2009). They also rank
features (characteristics) according to their importance in affecting the outcome, in this case the
investment decision. Decision trees can also capture interactions (non-linear relationships)
between features as the tree splits differently on different inputs. Linear regression and logistic
regression models fail in situations where the relationship between features and output is nonlinear
or where features interact with each other. To draw the tree structure, IBM SPSS model was used.
All 200 records were fed into the model for training, with the following configuration: max tree
depth=5, minimum records to split a parent node: 20 (10% of data) and the minimum records in a
child node: 10 (5% of data).
The root of the tree contains all 200 observations in the dataset. As shown in Figure 2, the
most important factor in determining whether a VC will finance a new startup is time into the VC
fund, and is used as the first decision rule to split the data. Time into the VC fund was previously
tested as a moderator variable, however, the decision tree confirms the results of LR in that the
time at which startups apply to the VC fund is of fundamental importance. From the illustration of
the decision tree, 125 startups had time into the fund > 2.5 years8, 112 were rejected (89.6%) and
only 13 startups were accepted (10.4%). Node 2 is said to be a pure node because it provided a
decision rule that split the data into roughly 90%-10% groups. This ratio means that we are 90%
8

Mean of the variable ‘time into VC fund’ calculated by the decision tree algorithm.
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confident that startups which apply after 2.5 years into the fund will be rejected. Out of a total of
136 rejected startups, this represents a rejection rate of 82.4% based on fund maturity alone. Along
the path time into the fund > 2.5 years, the tree further splits the data based on product stage.9 The
number of startups with undeveloped product were 94 startups. Only 3 startups (3%) were funded
and 91 startups (97%) were rejected. This leads to a high degree of confidence in the rejection of
startups that have undeveloped product given that they applied more than 2.5 years into the VC
fund.
Alternatively, out of 75 startups with time into the fund ≤ 2.5 years, 24 startups (32%) were
rejected and 51 startups (68%) were accepted. Node 1 is less pure and another split is made. A
decision rule based on industry experience is applied to the data (75 startups). Node 3 shows that
out of 31 startups with no industry experience, 17 startups (54.8%) were rejected and 14 (45.2%)
were accepted. Industry experience along this path resulted in a 50%-50% split of the data and the
node is said to be very impure. The tree applies a decision rule based on product stage. Along the
same path IndExp =0 (a total of 31 startups), for product stage =1 or 2, all 12 startups were rejected
(100%). For product stage =3 (a total of 19 startups), 5 startups (26.3%) were rejected and 14
startups (73.7%) are accepted. Along the path IndExp =1 (a total of 44 startups), 7 startups (16%)
were rejected and 37 startups (84%) were accepted (node 4). The tree then applied a decision rule
based on revenues. Along the same path IndExp =1, the number of startups with no revenues was
12 startups, of which 5 startups (42%) were rejected and 7 startups (58%) were accepted.
For revenue =1 (32 startups), 2 startups (6%) were rejected and 30 startups (94%) were
accepted. Node 10 is a highly pure node. When the number of startups become small, further splits
will cause over-fitting and the applied decision rules will be particular to specific cases and cannot
be generalized to other datasets.
As can be observed in Figure 3, the decision tree ranked the decision rules learnt from the data,
according to their importance and improvement contributed to the whole model, as follows: 1time into the VC fund, 2- product stage, 3- industry experience and 4- revenues. Another
important advantage of the decision tree is capturing interactions between decision rules. For
example if time into fund ≤ 2.5 years the entrepreneur has experience but no revenues, the
chances to get funded drops from 15% (30/200) to 3.5% (7/200). If the entrepreneur does not
have experience and the product is still being developed, the chances to get funded is almost
nonexistent even if he or she applied within 2.5 years from the start of the VC fund. Startups
applying after this window have a higher chance to get funded if their products are
commercialized.

‘Product stage’ is an ordinal variable alternative to the dichotomous ‘ready product’ where 1= prototype, 2=untested but viable
product and 3=commercialized product. The split by the decision tree indicates similar results to the LR analysis.
9
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Figure 2 Illustration of VC decision rules using decision tree
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Modeling the data using decision trees provided useful insights into how the independent
variables may interact together. Results showed that a higher rejection rate was attributed to
startups’ applying later into the VC fund than there was acceptance for those applying earlier. By
applying later, about 90% of startups were rejected in contrast, a startup applying in the first few
years was twice as likely to get funded, depending on its other characteristics. Because VCs seem
to make deals in the first years of the fund, the time into the VC fund, serves as the gateway for
further evaluation. This shows that the limited capital available for investment is a huge constraint
to the startup ecosystem. Next in importance is the product stage followed by industry experience.
Specifically, undeveloped products were often reason to reject a startup. However, not possessing
industry experience was not enough reason for rejection. A startup could still be considered for
funding, provided its product was fully developed. This reflects that, for a VC, a ready product
preceded experience. The faster products are brought to market, the faster a startup generates
revenue thus reducing the risk of investment to the VC. Unquestionably, the absence of industry
knowledge combined with an underdeveloped product guarantees that a startup will be rejected.
The availability of financial information about the startup were considered next in importance.
Startups that generated positive revenues, given they were not rejected for the previous three
criteria, have 35% higher chances to get funded. The availability of financial information means
that VCs can evaluate a startup more accurately.

Figure 3 Ranking of decision criteria according to decision tree analysis

8. Conclusion
The study shows that the decision to fund a new startup is mainly shaped by the
entrepreneur’s industry experience, product stage, revenues, time of applying to the VC fund, and
the size of the entrepreneur’s social network. Using decision trees to map VC decisions reveal that
the time of application to the VC fund serves as a gateway for further evaluation. Although
interwoven together, the stage of the product precedes the entrepreneur’s industry experience and
the availability of financial information in importance. Similar to the time of application, the
product stage is an important factor in startup rejection.
The study has important practical implications for entrepreneurs. Developing the product
and bringing it to market as fast as possible should be their first concern. Entrepreneurs should
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also work on cultivating business connections and engage in local and international startup events
to gain traction for their startups. Unfortunately, deciding when to apply is critical and the chances
of getting funded are greatly constrained by the limited number of VC funds. In a relatively young
ecosystem like the Egyptian venture capital market, VC-related characteristics are bound to play
an important role in shaping final funding outcomes. Venture capitalists, being focused on actual
performance metrics, tend to choose attractive startups with low business and market risk. While
the present study builds on and adds to previous work on VC investment criteria, the inability to
access deal-related data and other ‘sensitive’ financial information, such as VC returns and startup
valuations, restricted the number of variables under study. The use of such information can further
enrich our understanding of VC decision making and therefore may be an important venue for
future research.
REFERENCES
Alemany, L. & Villanueva, J. (2015). Early-stage investors’ criteria and new venture financial
performance: Are they related? Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2456197
Alsharif, A.A. (2015). Entrepreneurial finance in Egypt: Examination of the opportunities for a
venture capital industry from an institutional perspective. Durham theses. Durham University.
Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/11104/
Amit, R., Brander, J., & Zott, C. (1998). Why do venture capital firms exist? Theory and Canadian
evidence. Journal of Business Venturing, 13, 441–466. Elsevier Science Inc. University of
British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
Armandi, C. (2015). Exploring the drivers of investment decision-making in entrepreneurial
pitches (Master's thesis, University of Twente).
Bernstein, S., Korteweg, A., & Laws, K. (2017). Attracting early‐stage investors: Evidence from
a randomized field experiment. The Journal of Finance, 72(2), 509-538.
Bhide, A. V. (2000). The origin and evolution of new businesses (New York: Oxford University
Press).http://www.edegan.com/pdfs/Bhide%20(2000)%20%20The%20Origin%20And%20Evolution%20Of%20New%20Business.pdf
Carlos Nunes, J., Gomes Santana Félix, E., & Pacheco Pires, C. (2014). Which criteria matter most
in the evaluation of venture capital investments? Journal of Small Business and Enterprise
Development, 21(3), 505-527.
Chorev, S. & Anderson, A. R. (2006). Success in Israeli high-tech start-ups: critical factors and
process. Technovation, 26 (2), pp. 162-174
Cox, K. C., Lortie, J., & Gramm, K. (2017). The investment paradox: why attractive new ventures
exhibit relatively poor investment potential. Venture Capital, 19(3), 163-181.
Dimov, D., Shepherd, D. A., & Sutcliffe, K. M. (2007). Requisite expertise, firm reputation, and
status in venture capital investment allocation decisions. Journal of Business Venturing, 22 (4),
481-502.
Franke, N., Gruber, M., Harhoff, D., & Henkel, J. (2008). Venture capitalists' evaluations of start‐
up teams: Trade‐offs, knock‐out criteria, and the impact of VC experience. Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice, 32(3), 459-483.
ISMAIL AND MEDHAT * VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS * 22

THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE VOLUME 21, NO. 2 (WINTER 2019) 1-25

Fried, V. H., & Hisrich, R. D. (1994). Toward a model of venture capital investment decision
making. Financial management, 28-37.
Gompers, P. A. (1997). Ownership and control in entrepreneurial firms: An examination of
convertible securities in venture capital investments. Unpublished working paper, Harvard
Business School.
Gompers, P., Gornall, W., Kaplan, S. N., & Strebulaev, I. A. (2016a). How Do Venture Capitalists
Make Decisions? (No. w22587). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gompers, P., Kaplan, S. N., & Mukharlyamov, V. (2016b). What do private equity firms say they
do?. Journal of Financial Economics, 121(3), 449-476.
Gompers, P., Kovner, A., Lerner, J. & Scharfstein, D. (2008), Venture capital investment cycles:
The impact of public markets, Journal of Financial Economics 87, 1-23.
Gompers, P., Kovner, A., Lerner, J. & Scharfstein, D. (2010). Performance persistence in
entrepreneurship. Journal of Financial Economics 96(1), 18–32. Earlier version: Skill vs. luck
in entrepreneurship and venture capital: Evidence from serial entrepreneurs.
Gupta, A. & Sapienza, H. (1992). Determinants of venture capital firms’ preferences regarding the
industry diversity and geographic scope of their investments. Journal of Business Venturing,
7(5): 347–362.
Hall, J., & Hofer, C. W. (1993). Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new venture
evaluation. Journal of business venturing, 8(1), 25-42.
Harrison, R., Mason, C., & Smith, D. (2015). Heuristics, learning and the business angel
investment decision-making process. Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 27, 9-10.
Hastie, T., Tibshirani, R., & Friedman, J. H. (2009). The elements of statistical learning: Data
mining, inference, and prediction, Ch 8-307 www.web.stanford.edu/~hastie/ElemStatLearn/
(2009).
Hellmann, T., & Puri, M. (2000). The interaction between product market and financing strategy:
The role of venture capital. The Review of Financial Studies, 13(4), 959-984.
Hoenig, D., & Henkel, J. (2015). Quality signals? The role of patents, alliances, and team
experience in venture capital financing. Research Policy, 44 (5) 1049-1064.
Hsu, D. H. (2007). Experienced entrepreneurial founders, organizational capital, and venture
capital funding. Research Policy, 36(5), 722-741.
Ibrahim, D. M. (2013). Should angel-backed start-ups reject venture capital. Michigan Journal of
Private Equity and Venture Capital Law. http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1012andcontext=mbelrJ
Kaplan, S., Sensoy, B. A., & Strömberg, P. (2009). Should investors bet on the jockey or the horse?
Evidence from the evolution of firms from early business plans to public companies. The
Journal of Finance, 64(1), 75-115.
Kaplan, S., & Strömberg, P. (2000). How do venture capitalists choose investments? Working
Paper, University of Chicago, 121, 55-93.

ISMAIL AND MEDHAT * VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS * 23

THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE VOLUME 21, NO. 2 (WINTER 2019) 1-25

Köhn, A. (2018). The determinants of startup valuation in the venture capital context: a systematic
review and avenues for future research. Management Review Quarterly, Springer, 68(1) 3-36.
MacMillan, I. C., Siegel, R., & Narasimha, P. S. (1985). Criteria used by venture capitalists to
evaluate new venture proposals. Journal of Business venturing, 1(1), 119-128. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1504496
Mason, C. M. & Harrison, R. T. (1996). Informal venture capital: a study of the investment
process, the post-investment experience and investment performance. Entrepreneurship and
Regional Development, 8: 105- 125.
Mason, C., & Stark, M. (2004). What do investors look for in a business plan? A comparison of
the investment criteria of bankers, venture capitalists and business angels. International small
business journal, 22(3), 227-248.
Petty, J. S. & Gruber, M. (2011). In pursuit of the real deal: A longitudinal study of VC decision
making. Journal of Business Venturing, 26(2): 172–188.
Pries, F. (2001). Distinguishing successful from unsuccessful VC investments in technology-based
new ventures: How investment decision criteria relate to deal performance. Master's thesis.
University of Waterloo.
Rah J., Jung K., Lee J. (1994). Validation of the venture evaluation model in Korea, Journal of
Business
Venturing,
9,
(6),
509-524.
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0883902694900191
Sandberg, W. R., Schweiger, D. M., & Hofer, C. W. (1988). The use of verbal protocols in
determining venture capitalists’ decision processes. Entrepreneurship theory and practice,
13(1), 8-20.
Scheela, W., Isidro, E., Jittrapanun- T., & Trang, N. (2015). Formal and informal venture capital
investing in emerging economies in Southeast Asia. Pacific Journal of Management,
32(3), 597–617.
Sharma, M. (2015). Venture capitalists’ investment decision criteria for new ventures: A review.
Procedia. Social and Behavioral Sciences, 189, 465-470. ISSN 1877-0428.
Shepherd, D. (1999). Venture capitalists’ introspection: a comparison of “in use” and “espoused”
decision policies. Journal of Small Business Management, 37(2), 76.
Shepherd, D. A. & Zacharakis, A. (1999). Conjoint analysis: A new methodological approach for
researching the decision policies of venture capitalists. Venture Capital, 1(3): 197-217.
Silva, J. (2004). Venture capitalists’ decision-making in small equity markets: a case study using
participant observation. Venture Capital, 6, 125-145.
Simic, M. (2015). Investment criteria set by venture capitalists. Ekonomski vjesnik/EconviewsReview of Contemporary Business, Entrepreneurship and Economic Issues, 28(2), 457-479.
Streletzki, J. G., & Schulte, R. (2013). Which venture capital selection criteria distinguish highflyer investments? Venture Capital, 15(1), 29-52.
Tyebjee, T. T. & Bruno, A. V. (1984). A model of venture capitalist investment activity.
Management Science, 30(9): 1051–1066.
ISMAIL AND MEDHAT * VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS * 24

THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE VOLUME 21, NO. 2 (WINTER 2019) 1-25

Wiltbank, R., Sudek, R., & Read, S. (2009). The role of prediction in new venture
investing. Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, 29(2), 3.
Wright, M., & Robbie, K. (1998). Venture capital and private equity: A review and synthesis.
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 25(5-6), 521-569.
Wong, A., Bhatia, M., & Freeman, Z. (2009). Angel finance: The other venture capital. Strategic
change, 18(7-8), 221-230.
Zacharakis, A. L., & Meyer, G.D. (1998). A lack of insight: Do venture capitalists really
understand their own decision process? Journal of Business Venturing, 13 (1): 57–76.
Zhang, J. (2007). The advantage of experienced start-up founders in venture capital acquisition:
Evidence from serial entrepreneurs. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2964.

ISMAIL AND MEDHAT * VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS * 25

